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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
CARL JOHANSON and CLARA J.
JOHANSON, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

Case
No. 6302

vs.
CUDAHY PACKING COMPANY,
Defendant and Respondent.

Respondent's Reply Brief in
Support of Petition for Rehearing
I.
WHEN THE PLAINTIFFS CLAIMED AND WERE
AWARDED COMPENSATION FROM THE INSURANCE
CARRIER THEY PRECLUDED THEMSELVES FROM
OBTAINING ANY VESTED RIGHT OF THEIR OWN TO
RECOVER DAMAGES FROM THE DEFENDANT.
Upon the death of Robert Johanson whatever, if any,
action he had for wrongful injury died with him. Prior
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to the amendment of Section 5 of Article XVI of the Utah
Constitution (Nov. 2, 1920), and the enactment of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, the heirs of the deceased,
or his personal representative for the benefit of his heirs,
had a right to maintain an action against any person who
had wrongfully or negligently caused the death of Johanson
(see Sec. 6505 of the Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917). This
statute, as~ a part of the Code of Civil Procedure, provided
such a remedy, with the consequent right which resulted
from that remedy so provided. The action thus created
was purely statutory and entirely unknown to the common
law.
Platz v. International Smelting Co., 61 Utah,
342; 213 Pac. 187 (1923)
~,1[

In this Platz case the Court said :
"The cause of action here in question being
purely statutory, it must necessarily follow that
whenever the legislature has designated the agency
authorized to enforce such right, its enactment precludes any other agency from enforcing the right
or appealing to the courts for redress."
Thorpe v. Union Pacific Goal Co., 24 Utah, 475;
68 Pac. 145 (1902)
But Robert Johanson's death occurred on June 3, 1938.
On that date and ever since June 26, 1933, when the Revised
Statutes of Utah, 1933, took effect, Section 104-3-11 of the
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, (formerly Section 6505
of the Compiled Laws! of 1917) by its express terms excepted such a case as this from its operation, and this
Johanson case was and is controlled by Section 42-1-58 of
the Revised Statutes of 1933.

I·
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Under Section 42-1-58 of the Revised Statutes of 1933,
upon the death of Robert Johanson on June 3, 1938, the
plaintiffs, his dependents, had no vested rights. They had
a choice of two remedies : ( 1) compensation from his employer or its insurance carrier, or (2) an action to recover damages against defendant. When these dependents
claimed and were awarded compensation they could not
thereafter institute or maintain in their own right the action to recover damages against defendant. Their acquisition of the right to collect compensation precluded their
acquisition of the right to recover damages. When they
obtained the award of compensation their riglits were in
all respects the same as if Section 42-1-58 had expressly
provided that their remedy of compensation was alone and
by itself an exclusive one. The fact that these dependents
might receive some part of a judgment, if one was obtained by the insurance carrier from defendant, did not vest
in these dependents any interest in the action which said
dependents declined to take.
The plaintiffs, appellants here, in their brief contend
that they, independent of any assignment by the insurance
carrier, have an interest in the action against the defendant; that this interest was vested in them at the time of
the death of Robert Johanson. This was their theory at
the time they were in the Federal Court in their first suit
for $50,000, and it has been at all times· their theory in
this second suit for $2950. The plaintiffs' claim that the
insurance carrier made a waiver of its right to subrogation
and an assignment of its cause of action against the defendant is not primary but at most merely secondary; a sort
of an anchor to the windward ; a last extremity.
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That such is the contention of the plaintiffs is manifest from their brief lately filed in this rehearing proceeding, and the cases cited in such brief from Nebraska
and Minnesota. Those authorities are as follows:
Thomas v. Otis Elevator Co., 103 Neb. 401; 172
N. W. 53 (1919)
Hugh Murphy Construction Co. v. Serck, 104
Neb. 398; 177 N. W. 747 (1920)
O'Donnell v. Baker Ice Mach. Co., 114 Neb. 9;
205 N. W. 561 (1926)
In their opening brief the appellants cited MunCMter
v. Graharrn Ice Cream Co., 103 Neb. 379; 172 N. W. 52
(1919).
For the purpose of giving a true viewpoint of the
Nebraska law, the defendant cites:
Luckey v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 117 Neb. 85;
219 N. W. 802 (1928)
Bronder v. Otis Elevator Co., 121 Neb. 581;
237 N. W. 671 (1931)
Goers v. Goers, 124 Neb. 720; 248 N. W. 76
(1933)
Graham v. City of Lincoln, 106 Neb. 305; 183
N. W. 569 (1921)
On Page 14 of plaintiffs' brief they pretend to quote
the Nebraska statute, but they do not quote that statute in
full. If they had read the statute instead of some case which
quotes only in part, they would have found that as early
as 1913 it provided:
"Where a third person is liable to the employee
or to the dependents, for the injury or death, the
employer shall be subrogated to the right of the
employee or to the dependents against such third
person, and the recovery by such employer shall not
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be limited to the amount payable as compensation
to such employee or dependents, but such employer
may recover any amount which such employee or
his dependents would have been entitled to recover.
Any recovery by the employer against such third
person, in excess of the compensation paid by the
employer after deducting the expenses of making
such recovery, shall be paid forthwith to the employee or to the dependents, and shall be treated as
an advance payment by the employer, on account of
any future installments of compensation." (Italics
ours) (Omitted from Plaintiff's Brief)
(C. 198, Sec. 18, Laws of Nebraska, 1913. This section
was Sec. 3659 of the Revised Statutes of 1913 and 3041
of the Compiled Statutes of 1922.)
In 1929 the legislature of Nebraska, in order to make
its intent clear, added the following proviso:
"Provided, however, that nothing in this section
or act shall be construed to deny the right of an
injured employee or of his personal representative
to bring suit against said third person in his own
name or in the name of the personal representative
based upon said liability, but in such an event an
employer having paid or paying compensation to the
said employee or his dependents shall be made a party
to the suit for the purpose of reimbursement, under
the above provided right of subrogation, of any
compensation paid. Comp. St. 1929, Sec. 48-118."
(C. 135, Laws of Nebraska, 1929, or Sec. 48-118 of
the Compiled Statutes of 1929.)
Plaintiffs cite the following Minnesota cases :
City of Red Wing v. Eichinger, 163 Minn. 54;
203 N. W. 622 (1925)
McGuigan v. Allen, 165 Minn. 390; 206 N. W.
714 (1925)
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And for the purpose of giving a true viewpoint of
the Minnesota Law, the defendant cites:
Fidelity Casualty Co. v. St. Paul Gas Light Co.,
152 Minn. 197; 188 N. W. 265 (1922)
Guile v. Greenberg, 192 Minn. 548; 257 N. W.
649 (1934)
Dale v. Shaw Motor Co., 205 Minn. 99; 287
N. W. 787 (1939)
Gleason v. Sing, ______ Minn. ______ ; 297 N. W. 720
(1941) (Not yet officially reported)
Gile v. Yellow Cab Co., 177 Minn. 579; 225
N. W. 911 (1929)
In view of the fact that the statutes of Nebraska and
Minnesota have statutory enactments similar in some respects to those of the State of Wisconsin, defendant cites:
Swanson v. Lake Superior Ry. Co., 195 Wis.
633; 219 N. W. 274 (1928)
Employers' Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Icke,
225 Wis. 304; 274 N. W. 823 (1927)
London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Wisconsin
Public Service Corp., 228 Wis. 441; 279
N. W. 76 (1938)
Standard Surety Co. v. Spewackek, 233 Wis.
158; 288 N. W. 758 (1939)
(Under the Minnesota statutes, third persons engaged
in the furtherance of common enterprises or purposes with
those of the employer may come within the Workmen's
Compensation Act. "There is no statute in any other state
similar to the last paragraph above quoted." Gile v. Yellow
Cab Co., supra.)
It ought to be a sufficient answer to the plaintiffs'
contention, that they have an interest in the action against
the defendant in their own right, and not as assignee, to
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point out that the decisions from the States of Minnesota
and Nebraska are based upon statutes quite different from
those in force in the State of Utah. These Minnesota and
Nebraska cases make clear why the defendant is right in
contending that the plaintiffs, by claiming and obtaining
an award of compensation, under the Utah Statute cut
themselves off from acquiring a rig'ht to, sue the defendant
for damages, and why the insurance company, "having
paid the compensation" thereby could become vested in its
own right, not as an assignee, to sue for such damages.
Counsel for plaintiffs have throughout this entire litigation cited cases from other states without any apparent
realization of the importance of the fact that a difference
in statute results in a difference in decision. It is believed
that an examination of the cases above cited will create a
desire in the mind of every member of this court to avoid
the difficulties that have been encountered by the courts
of Nebraska, Minnesota and Wisconsin in applying and
construing their laws providing for workmen's compensation.
It should be noted that in Minnesota the action for
death by wrongful act is by statute a survival of the action for personal injury (see Sections 9656, 9657, Minnesota Revised Statutes), and that only the personal representative of the deceased may sue. In the States of Nebraska and Wisconsin causes of action for personal injuries
have been assignable for many years, even long prior to
the enactment of compensation laws.
In the case of Hugh Murphy Construction Co. v. Serck,
104 Neb. 398; 177 N. W. 747 (1920), the Nebraska Court
said:
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"There is no provision in the Nebraska statute,
as in those of some states, requiring the injured
employee to elect between claiming compensation
under the statute and an action for damages against
the negligent third party. The following cases support our conclusion:"
The court then cites :
McGarvey v. Independent Oil & Grease Co.,
156 Wis. 580; 146 N. W. 895 (1914)
In Wisconsin causes of action for injuries survive, and
for that reason are held to be property rights. (See McGarvey case.)
Lehmann v. Deuster, 95 Wis. 185; 70 N. W. 170;
37 L. R. A. 333 (1897)
In this Lehmann case, cited in defendant's opening
brief for rehearing, it was held that if the cause of action
survived it was assignable, and the McGarvey opinion says:
"Thus it will be seen that an ordinary claim for
damages for a tortious injury to the person, notwithstanding it was otherwise at common law, is a
property right which may pass by assignment or
operation of law, with the incidental right to a judicial remedy, by and in the name of, the real party
in interest, to enforce it." (Italics ours)
(This supports the defendant's definition of a property right.) (See opening brief, P. 67.)
In Minnesota it has been said that it is an open question whether the contributory negligence of a workman
who has received compensation from his employer can be
asserted by a third party as a defense when sued by the
employer to recover the amount of compensation paid (186
N. W. 863; 2'46 N. W. 528) ; but in that state it was held
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by a divided court that the third person might assert the
employer's contributory negligence as a defens.e (246 N.
W. 527). On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Nebraska
held that the employer's contributory negligence could not
be as~erted as a defense by the third person.
There are other differences which might be pointed
out, but in the main Nebraska, Minnesota and Wisconsin
stand somewhat by themselves. Although it is somewhat
difficult to state, it is believed that the plan of those states
may be stated as follows :
If the death of an employee is caused by the wrongful
act of a third person, a cause of a·ction vests immediately
in the surviving and designated beneficiaries of the deceased. The third person, wrongdoer, is in the language
of the statute "liable" to the dependents who have been
damaged by the death of the employee. (Sec. 48-118 Neb.
Statutes, 1929.) The Compensation Act does not disturb
or affect this liability. (Of course, if it deprives the third
person of the defense of contributory negligence, then to
that extent the preceding statement is inaccurate.) The
beneficiaries designated by the statute may have compensation from the employer, and they may also nave damages
from the third person. In the language of the Red Wing
case (203 N. W. 622), "he (referring to the injured employee) could pursue both." No election is required in
either Minnesota or Nebraska. (Excepting common purpose
statute of Minnesota.)
In the language of the Supreme Court of Minnesota
(Gleason v. Sing, supra), "the third party liability has for
its basis tortious conduct on the part of one who is not
the employer resulting in harm to the injured workman. The
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amount of recovery is measured by the common law standard of damages" (except where the third person and the
employer are co-operating to a common purpose.)
And again:
"The employer's liability under the Compensation
Act on the other hand is not based upon negligence
but depends upon whether the workman suffered
an injury caused by the accident arising out of and
in the course of his employment."
And again:
"We think it is apparent that the present Act
recognizes and preserves the common law liability
resting upon a third party's negligence in cases of
this nature. Therefore, the receipt of compensation
by the injured employee does not deprive him of his
right of recovery upon the facts here shown."
The taking of compensation in Minnesota or Nebraska
is not a surrender of the vested right to damages; (nor
is it a refu.sal of a.n inchoate proffered right, as it i8 im:
Utah). If the beneficiaries take compensation from the
master or the insurance carrier, and thereafter recover
damages from the third person, the master or insurance
carrier has in effect a lien on the judgment for damages
to the extent of the compensation that has been paid by
the master or insurance carrier. If the master or insurance carrier sues and recovers, he then keeps out of the
amount recovered the compensation that has been paid and
the expenses incurred in the litigation. If the designated
beneficiaries or dependents sue, the master or insurance
carrier can make himself or itself a party, and thereby
protect the interest that it has acquired by paying com-
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pensation. (These rights as against the third person are
property rights, not in any quasi-contractual sense nor at
common law, but because of the survival statutes. (146
N. W. 895, supra.)
The primary purpose of these statutes in the States
of Nebraska, Minnesota and Wisconsin is to protect the
employee in case of injury or his dependents i:p. case of
death. They have an incidental purpose of protecting the
employer or insurance carrier if any recovery is had from
the third person who wrongfully causes injury to or death
of the employee. The master is relieved of all liability for
negligence, and at the same time he is compeled to pay compensation, even though such master is guilty of no fault.
The employer or insurance carrier, in the prosecution of
the action against the third person, stands in the shoes of
the employee. (279 N. W. 76, supra.)
The Utah plan is basically entirely different from that
prevailing in Minnesota, Nebraska or Wisconsin.
Hunt v. Bankline, 35 Fed. (2d) 136 (1929)
Bruso's Case, 295 Mass. 531; 4 N. E. (2d) 308
(1936)
Lang v. Brooklyn City R. Co., 217 N.Y. S. 277
(1928)
Lang v. Brooklyn City R. Co., 247 N. Y. 551;
161 N. E. 178 (1928)
Orange City Ice Co. v. Texas Compensation Ins.
Co., 278 Fed. 8 (5· C. C. A.; 1922)
Some of these and many other cases which might be
cited are predicated upon statutes which do require an
election on the part of the injured employee or his dependents in case of his death. Such statutes are in direct contrast to those of Nebraska and her associates, Wisconsin
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and Minnesota. Under these statutes, when the dependents
make an election to take and are awarded compensation,
then they never obtain or acquire a right to sue the third
person, wrongdoer. This right is not transferred from
them but it is never acquired by them. The insurance
carrier, when it sues, sues in its own right, and not as an
assignee, statutory or otherwise. (278 Fed. 8; 65 Fed,
(2d) 650). It cannot be an assignee, without an assignor.
In Utah, upon the death of an employee, if it is caused
by the wrongful act of a third person, the right to recover
does not vest until there has been an election by the dependents of the deceased. They may at their option have
compensation from the master or insurance carrier, or they
may have their action for damages against the third person. (Sec. 42-1-58.) This is one part of the statute that
needs no construction or interpretation. If counsel for
plaintiffs is looking for "the intent of the legislature" (appellants' brief, P. 9), then here he may find it without
suffering from a laborious study of common law actions
and common law pleadings. Even a perusal of the Code will
be unnecessary.
This plain provision can be amended by the legislature and the injured employee or his dependents may by
such amendment be granted both compensation and damages, but no amount of "social and economic adjustment"
(plaintiffs' brief, P. 11) can avoid its effect on the mind
of an honest man, whether he appears: in behalf of an insuran~e company, a packing company, or some other person
more or less fortunate.
Under this Utah plan the dependents cannot take the
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benefits of compensation from the master and then the
benefits of the action for damages against the third person. Emphatic but ill-timed assertions, about "gross negligence" (plaintiffs' brief, P. 11) cannot properly influence
anyone to disregard an open-eyed election by dependents,
advised as they were by unusually zealous and public-spirited
counsel.
In the absence of fraud on the part of the defendant,
the election of the plaintiffs stands. Even fraud on the
part of the insurance carrier does not avoid an election to
take damages.
Tews v. C. T. Hanks Coal Co., 267 Mich. 466;
255 N. W. 227 (1934)
This case is but a partial illustration of the effects
of a traffic in compensation rights so ardently defended
by counsel for plaintiffs (Plaintiffs' brief, P. 11). It seems
that the insurance carrier was making an "economic adjustment." In so doing it perpetrated a fraud on an employee who was suffering from the amputation of a leg.
By false promises this insurance carrier induced the injured man to accept $2000 from a railroad corporation who
had injured the employee at a railroad crossing. After the
plaintiff had received the $2000, he filed an application for
compensation from his employer, as he had been told by the
insurance adjuster he might do. The Compensation Board
held that the representations made by the insurance carrier
prevented the application of the statutory rule otherwise
following an election; but the Supreme Court of Michigan
was compelled to deny compensation, saying in part:
"The Compensation Law is in derogation of the
common law, and therefore its measure of relief
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may not be extended beyond its express terms; it
is a legislative creation permitting no enlargement
by principles of equity or common-law adaptations.
It is arbitrary, and, where it speaks, nothing can be
added nor changed by judicial pronouncement. It
imposes liability upon operatives under its provisions
and measures exclusive relief in its own terms. This
law permits an employee, injured in the course of
his employment by the negligence of a third party,
to have compensation from his employer or from the
third party, but not from both. The employee may
elect his remedy, but cannot, even by agreement
with the employer, have remedy in part from the
third party for a tort and in part against his employer under the Compensation Law. The remedy
against the third party is at common law and that
under the Compensation Law wholly foreign to the
common law. The two laws bear no relation, and
their remedies cannot be mixed, except by express
statutory authority. Remedy had under one wholly
excludes the employee from the other.
"The statutes of some states permit proceedings
against both the employer and the negligent third
person, but double recovery is not permitted."
If the brief of counsel for defendant has not convinced
this Court that the plai.ntiffs are seeking in the instant
case to recover in their own right and not as assignees~ of
the insurance carrier, then it is submitted that the brief
filed by the plaintiffs will have that effect. The plaintiffs
do not rely upon or defend the so-called "assignment." By
their silence they admit that subrogation is not assignment. They did not allege payment of the award of com·
pensation, first, because the award itself would disprove
payment, and, second, because on the theory of plaintiffs,
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the award paid or unpaid is immaterial. It, according to.
the plaintiffs' theory, is of no concern either to the defendant or to the courts.
It is submitted that if the legislature of this state had
intended the dependents of a deceased employee to have
the right to compensation, and then conjunctively and a.t
the same time have the right to recover damages from the
third person who negligently caused the death of the employee, "it would have been easy to say so," instead of providing in express terms for an election by the dependents
as to these alternative remedies; and because the legislature did not "say so," rational individuals are compelled to
conclude that it did not intend that either the injured employee, or his dependents in case of death, should have a
double recovery. ("Easy to say so" has become a rule of
construction.)

II.
THE SUBROGATION OF THE MASTER OR ITS INSURANCE CARRIER TO THE RIGHT OF ACTION TO SUE
FOR DAMAGES CANNOT TAKE EFFECT UNDER THE
STATUTE UNTIL THE AWARD OF COMPENSATION
HAS BEEN PAID. SUCH SUBROGATION DOES NOT
CHANGE THE CHARACTER OF THE ACTION FOR
WRONGFUL DEATH FROM ONE THAT IS NON-ASSIGNABLE TO ONE THAT IS ASSIGNABLE. THE CHARACTER OF THE LIABILITY OF THE THIRD PERSON
IS NOT AFFECTED BY THE STATUTE PROVIDING FOR
SUBROGATION.
It is believed it has been established that no right ever
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vested in the plaintiffs to institute or maintain this action, and consequently no right was ever transferred from
them by the statute. One cannot give up or have taken
from him that which he never had.
Plaintiffs cite in their brief City of Red Wing v. Eichinger, 163 Minn. 54; 203 N. W. 622 (1925). In that case the
city carried compensation insurance with the Travelers Insurance Company. A streetsweeper was injured. He applied for and received an award of compensation, and the
insurance company paid that compensation. The city then
brought suit against Eichinger, claiming that the injury of
the streetsweeper was, due to the negligence of the defendant. The statute of Minnesota recognized the insurer as
such. In this respect it is like the statute of Utah. The
statute providing for subrogation, however, was different
because it provided for a subrogation when the employer
has paid or has obliga"bed hims;elf to pay an award of compensation.
The Court held that the city was not obligated to pay
anything and had paid nothing, and consequently it could
not maintain the action. In so deciding the Court said:
"A statutory subrogation has the same characteristics as if it were a creature of equity. It is
enforced solely for the purpose of accomplishing the
ends of substantial justice, and does not depend upon
any contractual relation between the parties."
Henderson Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Owensboro Tel.
& Tel. Co., 192 Ky. 322; 233 S. W. 743
(1921)
In the Kentucky case there had been an award of com·
pensation to an injured employee and that award had been
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paid by the insurance carrier. The statute of Kentucky
provided as follows :
"The employer, having paid the compensation
or having become liable therefor, shall have the right
to recover in his own name."
It was held that the statute gave no right of action to

the insurance company, and that the employer, not having
paid or become liable to pay, could not bring and maintain
the action.
It is quite clear from the Kentucky case that without
the aid of a statute the insurance company would have no
equitable ground for subrogation. The insurance company
is in the indemnity business and accumulates a large fund
by the collection of premiums, and when it pays it appropriates from such fund such part as is necessary in the given
case to satisfy the award. It has lost nothing whatever.
(Such. was the reasoning of the Kentucky Court.)
But the Utah statute recognizes the right of the insurance carrier to recover. That right cannot be disputed, providing the insurance company complies with the condition
precedent stated in the statute. The insurance carrier must
have paid the award before it can become vested with the
right of action.
Broderick v. Puget, Sound Traction Light &
Power Co., 86 Wash. 399; 150 Pac. 616
(1915)
In that case it appeared that an automobile belonging
to the plaintiff had come into collision with a freight car
owned by the defendant company. Her automobile wasi fully
repaired by the Broadway Automobile Company, whose
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duty it was to take care of such automobile. No insurance
was ever paid by the insurance carrier and the plaintiff
paid out nothing for the repairs. The plaintiff undertook
to contend that she was a trustee of an express trust, and
when that contention failed she contended that the defendant was not in a position to object to the action being prosecuted in the name of the appellant, but the Supreme Court
of Washington said that her automobile having been fully
repaired, she had no right to compensation from the person
causing the injury. Therefore the dismissal of the trial
court was affirmed.
Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. v. Indianapolis C. & T. Co., Ind. App., 139 N. E. 200
(1923)
This case involved an elective statute, in the elective
respect not unlike that of Utah. It was held that if the
employee elected to take compensation and accepted payment from his employer, he thereby surrendered whatever
right of action he had to recover from the person whose negligence caused his injury.
The Indiana statute provided:
"and if compensation is awarded and accepted under
this Act, the employer having paid the compensation, or having become liable therefor, may collect'.',
etc.
Under the policy of insurance carried by the employer
the subrogation did not take place until the insurance carrier had paid, and it was held that the insurance company's
right of action "did not accrue until the compensation had
been paid."
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Now, it will be noticed that these statutes from other
states permit subrogation to take place when the insurance
carrier has become obligated to pay, but in Utah the insurance carrier does not become subrogated until it has paid
the compensation awarded. The law seems to be well settled
that if these beneficiaries should die before the award made
in this case had been fully paid, then all installments that
had become due and payable during the lifetime of the beneficiaries would belong to their estate, but that as to installments yet to become due after their deaths, neither the insurance company nor the employer would be required to
pay the same.
There is some apparent conflict in the holdings of the
courts of various states, but such apparent conflict is due
to a difference in the survivorship statutes of those states.
Tierney v. Tierney & Co., 176 Minn. 464; 223
N. W. 773 (1929)
In this case the Supreme Court of Minnesota said:
"That the right" (to compensation) "is purely
statutory and does not extend beyond the life of the
beneficiary unless the statute so provides; that the
right, being non-assignable, does not survive to others
at death; that it grew out of the contract of employment, is in lieu of wages, is personal like the contract of employment, and is terminated by death,
as that would have terminated the contract out of
which it grew; that it is intended for the personal
benefit of the beneficiary, and is not a vested right
nor transmissible to others, and that, the statute
having specified the rights granted to dependents,
they possess only those so specified."
See also 51 A. L. R., 1446 for a collection of the authorities upon this subject.
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It is believed it may be assumed in this case that it
will be impossible to determine the loss of the insurance
carrier except upon full payment of the award, but the insurance carrier in this case does not allege that it has paid
anything, and under the statute it cannot acquire any cause
of action until it has paid in full, or until for some reason it
has been discharged of any further obligation to pay.
For the purpose of argument, however, and for that
purpose only, let it be assumed that the subrogation has become complete. That subrogation did not come about by
virtue of any contract, but it resulted solely from and because of the statute, and in the language of the Red Wing
case, it had all the characteristics of an equitable subrogation. When that subrogation takes place, then the character of the third person's liability is not changed or altered in
the slightest respect. The insurance carrier then recovers
upon only the cause of action to enforce the liability in
tort for negligently killing the deceased. That is the only
basis of the action which the insurance carrier is given the
right to maintain. (279 N. W. 78, supra.)
If the cause of action against the third person is· a
property right, i. e. if it survives in favor of the estate of
the person damaged and against the estate of the wrongdoer, then it is ass,ignable, and this is true independent of
the existence of Section 42·-1-58. The enactment of that
section did not provide for assignability or survivability.
The situation is the exact opposite of McGarvey v.
Independent Oil & Grease Co., 156 Wis. 580; 146 N. W.
895 (1914). In Wisconsin causes of action for personal
injuries. are property, i.e. they survive and have been made
to survive from a very early date. The plaintiff McGarvey
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was injured. He applied for and obtained compensation
from his employer. That compensation was paid and then
the employer assigned its claim against the wrongdoer to
the plaintiff. The question arose as to the assignability of
the cause of action, and the Court said :
"Before its enactment" (referring to the statute) "the employer could purchase an employee's
claim for damages against one who had wrongfully
injured him in his person or his property, and enforce it in his own name. In such a case the amount
paid for the claim would not militate, necessarily,
against its enforceability, or the measure of the
recovery, or in any way affect the claim as to assignability. The letter of the statute, as well as its purpose, seems to be that, in case of a compulsory purchase of such a claim the nature of it shall not at all
be changed."
It was held that because the claim was assignable before the Workmen's Compensation Statute was passed, it
was assignable after that event. The Compensation Statute
did not destroy its assignability, nor did it create that assignability.
It is submitted that the plaintiffs here, by reason of the
fact that they applied for and received an award of compensation, never acquired any cause of action against the
defendant; that the insurance carrier has not yet acquired
such cause of action because it has not paid the award, and
when the subrogation is complete, and not until then, the
insurance company will have acquired a cause of action
against the defendant if the defendant wrongfully and negligently caused the death of the deceased; that the statute
providing for this subrogation does not provide for any as-
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signment, and that the subrogation does not change the
character of the cause of action.

III.
THIS COURT HAS NO POWER TO REVERSE THIS
JUDGMENT MERELY TO PERMIT THE PLAINTIFFS
TO AMEND THEIR COMPLAINT.

Article VIII of the State Constitution vests the judicial
power of this state in the senate, sitting as a court of impeachment, in a supreme court, in district courts and in
justices of the peace, and then it provides for the legislative creation of such other courts as may from time to
time be established.
Section 4 of Article VIII grants this court original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto and habeas corpus. It then provides:
"In other cases the Supreme Court shall have
appellate jurisdiction only, and power to issue
writs necessary and proper for the exercise of that
jurisdiction."
In Section 9 of Article VIII it is provided as follows:
"From all final judgments of the district courts,
there shall be a right of appeal to the Supreme Court.
The appeal shall be upon the record made in the
court below and under such regulations as may be
provided by law. In equity cases the appeal may be
on questions of both law and fact; in cases at law the
appeal shall be on questions of law alone." (Italics
ours)
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Section 104-41-1 of the Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933,
among other things provides :
"The appeal shall be upon the record made in
the district court. In equity cases the appeal may
be on questions of both law and fact; in cases at
law the appeal shall be on questions of law alone."
(Of course the statute was of necessity in accord with
the Constitution.)
Even prior to statehood the Supreme Court of the
Territory of Utah had no power to review and decide questions of fact in law cases, and matters not urged in the
court below could not be first urged on appeal.
Mr. District Judge Pratt, speaking as a member of this
court, set forth the law upon this subject with absolute
accuracy in 1919.
Valiotis v. Utah-Apex Mining Co., 55 Utah, 151;
184 Pac. 802 (1919)
He wrote the opinion in the case cited, and among other
things said :
"But as the right or power to review and decide
controverted questions of fact on appeal in law
cases did not exist prior to statehood and did exist,
as now by constitutional provision, in equity cases,
the constitutional restriction of appeals in law cases
to the review of questions of law alone was probably
intended to preserve this distinction without material change." (184 Pac. 807)
Without further citation of authority, and because the
provision of the Constitution itself is sufficient, it can be
said that this court in this action at law has appellate jur-
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isdiction and that only. In the exercise of that jurisdiction
it can decide only such questions of law as are presented
upon appeal. Assignments of error are necessary to invoke
the jurisdiction of the court. Only matters challenged by
appeal and assignments of error are presented for review.
"This court is not authorized, either by statute
or rules of the court, to review any ruling of the
district court unless error is assigned designating
or specifying the alleged error."
Perrin v. Union Pacific R. Co., 59 Utah 1, 201
Pac. 405 (1921)
(This quotation is from Page 411)
The only question of law that is presented, {)r that can
be involved in this case, cannot be stated otherwise than as
follows: Does the complaint state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action in favor of the plaintiffs and
against the defendant?
If this question must be answered in the negative, as
it seems that it must be, then the judicial controversy between the plaintiffs and the defendant is ended and is
beyond debate.
Von Drachenfels v. Doolittle, 77 Cal. 295·; 19
Pac. 518 (1888)
What is a question of law except an issue of law; a
matter of law in dispute? The demurrer in this case presented that issue of law to the trial court. F'or the purposes
of the demurrer it conceded all facts well pleaded in the
.complaint. It was then contended by the defendant that on
the facts pleaded in the complaint there was no cause of
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action. The trial court sustained that contention, and thereby decided the only issue at law that has ever existed in this
case. If the plaintiff had asked leave to amend, and the trial
court had denied that request and the plaintiffs had appealed and assigned that denial of the right to amend as
error, then this Court would have had before it a question
of law which would have involved a review of the trial
court's discretion. The question would have been: Did the
trial court abuse its discretion in denying the right to
amend?
But the trial court did not deny the plaintiffs a right
to amend their complaint. On the other hand, the trial
court affirmatively granted leave to amend and the plaintiffs refused to amend. That is the record in this court.
When the plaintiffs refused to amend, after waiting
the statutory time the trial court entered judgment for
the defendant.
Then the plaintiffs appealed and the error assigned
was that the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer
of the defendant. This record presents no other question
of law than that pres~nted by the plaintiffs, appellants here.
The matter of amendment of the complaint was for
the District Court. It was a matter within that court's, discretion. Of course, that court could not abuse its discretion
and that court did not, because it allowed the plaintiffs to
amend and the plaintiffs refused to amend. The District
Court did not commit any error in entering judgment for
the defendant. The only possibility of error on the part of
the District Court was that of sustaining the demurrer. As
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long as the District Court adhered to that ruling, then
upon the refusal of the plaintiffs to amend, the District
Court could not do otherwise than enter judgment for the
defendant.
Let it be assumed for the purpose of argument, and
for that purpose only, that the plaintiffs' counsel made a
mistake in refusing to amend (they did not), and that such
mistake was one from which relief could be obtained under
Section 104-14-4, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, as amended
by Chapter 121 of the Laws of Utah, 1939. It would be an
extreme case, but the writer can conceive of such a case. It
will likely never happen.
Suppose, for instance, that there was collusion between
counsel for defendant and counsel for plaintiffs and that
the plaintiffs' counsel was not true to his clients, and for
that reason deliberately and dishonestly refused to amend,
then, perhaps, the plaintiffs could get new counsel and make
proof of the fact of collusion, tender an amended complaint,
ask the court to set aside the judgment, and allow the complaint to be filed. Thi~, of course, would require a showing
of diligence on the part of the plaintiffs and the facts would
be determined by the trial court. Under the section just
referred to it is believed that the trial court would have
jurisdiction to grant the proper relief, and if the trial court
did not grant it, then an appeal could be taken and the
matter presented to this court as a question of law.
Upon what would the jurisdiction of the trial court
depend? Under the section above referred to the applica-
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tion for relief must be made within a reasonable time "not
exceeding ninety days after the making or occurrence of
the judgment, order or other proceeding sought to be relieved from." That is the language of the statute, and unless
the application was made within ninety days the District
Court would have~jurisdiction.
The judgment in the case at bar was made and entered
on the 17th day of May, 1940. No application for relief was
made to the District Court, and the appeal from the judgment was taken to this court 87 or 88 days after the entry
of the judgment in the district court. The date of the appeal
was August 13, 1940, and in this court no assignment of
error has been made, or could be made, involving the right
of the plaintiffs to amend, because they were given that
right by the trial court, and refused that right. At no time
have counsel for plaintiffs asserted that plaintiffs should
be allowed to amend, and the compensation award, a certified
copy of which has been presented to this Court for the
purpose of showing that no amendment could be made, does
show that no amendment can be made.
City of Durango v. Luttrell, 18 Colo. 123; 31
Pac. 853 (1892)
Quotation from a unanimous opinion of the Colorado
Court:
"To justify the reversal of a judgment rendered in a civil action by a court having jurisdiction
of the subject-matter and the parties, the record
brought to this. court for review must discloseFirst, some manifest error affecting the substantial
rights of the party seeking such reversal; second,
such error must appear either in the record proper,
or, if committed in respect to some interlocutory or-
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der, ruling, or decision, not a part of the record
proper, the same must have been brought to the attention of the trial court in such apt time and manner as to afford opportunity for correction, and the
record of such error must be regularly preserved by
bill of exceptions or otherwise ; and third, the matter
relied on for reversal must be duly assigned for
error upon the record brought to this court."
See also In Re Kingsley's Estate, 93 Cal. 576; 29 Pac.

244 (1892)
Quotation from California Supreme Court:
"With the process of reasoning by which the
court reached its conclusion we have nothing to do.
That may have been erroneous and the ruling correct. To justify a reversal, it is incumbent upon the
appellant to show an erroneous ruling, and not merely
bad reasoning or mistaken views of the law."
2 Encyc. of Pleading and Practice, Pages 499507

CONCLUSION
In conclusion let it be said that to the writer of this
brief it seems certain that this Court has no power to reverse a judgment as a mere matter of grace (ex mera
gratia). The Constitution created the court. It stated that
court's jurisdiction, and it submitted that the court cannot
lawfully assume any greater jurisdiction than that granted
by the Constitution, viz. : to determine the only question of
law presented by the record. The appellants raised the
only question of law that is possible from that record. If
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that question is decided against the appellants, then it is
submitted that the judgment must be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
MARLON E. WILSON,
ROBERT C. WILSON,
Attorneys for Respondent.
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